Interagency Disater Management of the US Midwest Floods of 1993 and how it Might be Managed Different Today

When the disaster subsided, meetings and hearings were convened, new policies were drafted, and the administration of Clinton assigned a task force. Key decision makers and legislators required documents, reports, assessments and development programs. A small portion of the population affected by the catastrophic flooding, whether they are on the floodplain or in the Beltway, hope for genuine reform, though, for different rationales: the flood-control strategy as well as the interagency flood management spends too much money, persuades behavior that worsens the predicament, and gives out some luscious boons to a privileged few, which consequently cultivated recurrent environmental crises (Sharp et al., 1997).As soon as the waters ebbed, interests in and attempts for reconstruction have receded as well. The gravely desired reforms in the system will, as the past has showed us, stayed mainly unmade. Afterward, with the following great flood, the same succession of hand-pressing, downpour of sympathy and financial assistance, and the consequent grief about costs, illogicalities, and injustices will be repeated. It is quite terrible. In fact, the solutions are not costly or even technologically complicated. They decided, though, to resolve a number of steamy issues, to deal with the execution rigidly and fairly, and, most importantly, more political moral fiber than is normally observed when flood-management decisions are usually made while the flooding devastates the lives of the people within its reach.In President Clinton’s State of the Union Address in 1994, he referred to the US Midwest Flood of 1993 as a‘500-year flood,’ which consequently led numerous people to think that such a catastrophe, could only occur once every 500 years. However, that is logically invalid. Such a hurricane could possibly happen the following spring. Our watercourses are speckled with United States Geological Survey